The First World War was one of the costliest wars if not the costliest war in the last two millennia. Both Allied and Central powers lost much in terms of manpower, military strength, production capability, and economic stability.
[1] Given historical tensions between Germany and France dating back to the Franco-Prussian War of 1870, the French leadership saw an opportunity in the end of the war to weaken Germany vis-à-vis the Versailles Treaty of 1919, the WWI postwar settlement.
[2] The original stipulations of the Versailles Treaty were designed to weaken Germany militarily, politically, and economically to ensure that it was not strong enough to attack France or its neighbors. Such conditions included demilitarization of areas such as the Rhineland or the Saar Valley, limitations on the size of the German military, monetary reparations, and loss of territory.
[3] British Prime Minister Lloyd George, American President Woodrow Wilson, and the new German Weimar government, among others, agreed to these stipulations
[4]. However, a number of figures – such as the French President Georges Clemenceau and General Ferdinand Foch – claimed outright that the Treaty of Versailles could not and would not do enough to ensure the security of France or any of Germany’s other neighbors since Germany itself was fundamentally strong economically and militarily.
[5] This paper argues that that the Treaty of Versailles, albeit not perfectly implemented, managed to sufficiently weaken Germany’s military and military command structure postwar with relation to those of France, while at the same time didn’t do much to weaken Germany’s economy in spite of its reparatory dues. Groundwork for the comparison of the strengths of these two nations will be established prior to addressing the argument. Following that will be an assessment of the events and the political relations that transpired during the postwar years when the Treaty was being implemented, and how these relations factor into the question of national strength.
Prior to addressing the thesis, it is important to establish the groundwork used for the comparison of national strengths in relation to national security. The measure of a nation’s security is based on its military strength, and the stability of its economical and political climates.
[6] Besides defense, a military presence serves a deterring purpose.
[7] Stronger militaries tend to be large, efficient, well-staffed, and more technologically advanced.
[8] It can be assumed, therefore, that a larger, more organized, more sophisticated military would therefore present a greater deterrent than a smaller, simpler, disorganized one. This is not, however, a guarantee that another nation or body will attack the said nation, but rather that the chance of attacking that nation is reduced.
[9] Consequently, the larger the population size of a country, the more human resources available for conscription as well as production of supplies such as weapons, munitions, food, and water.
[10] The modern People’s Army of China exemplifies this notion. In analyzing statistics concerning population, troop numbers, equipment, and staffing, one can provide a quantitative comparison of military strengths of any two or more nations.
[11] In effect, a successful standing army is not without a steady stream of resources to cover its supplies and weaponry.
[12] The nation of said army would preferably have stable, independent industries based on home-grown and home-found resources, with little to no dependence on outside sources such as foreign colonies and the resources found there
[13]. Prime among these are agriculture, textiles, ore, transportation, and manufacturing, some of which – such as ore processing, transportation, and manufacturing – are interdependent on each other. A more stable and efficient economy is not only able to bolster a standing army, but is also more resilient in the face of resource attrition during wartime and in“Total War”
[14]. World War One was one such war, and was in fact the first such war of attrition. Thus, assessing economic output and capability would prove a vital measure of national strength in this thesis. For this topic, gross domestic product (GDP) and industry are sufficient enough measures to obtain a valid assessment of economic strength.
While a stable political climate may not necessarily entail security, a country in political turmoil is worse off than one that is not. The degree of such turmoil would affect economic progress given the nation’s economic disposition. The more established an economy is, however, the more the degree of unrest, political or otherwise, required to completely destabilize it. Moreover, political process may hinder economic progress in particular areas, especially in the light of annexation of areas of vital economic and strategic importance
[15]. Political climate in terms of international relations will be considered given the profound effect World War One had on the political leadership and structures of France and Germany.
The implementation of the Versailles Treaty managed to sufficiently weaken Germany military with respect to France. Part V of the Treaty of Versailles laid a number of military restrictions on Germany. By disarming the German military and reducing troop number, the Allied powers hoped to guarantee the security of the surrounding nations. It stipulated that the German military be reduced to 100,000 men, 4,000 of them being officers and zero heavy and field artillery, and that there should be no high staffing: no headquarter staff, no divisional headquarter staff, and no infantry division organization
[16]. Before the armistice, Germany had 5,500,000 army men, 140,000 officers, 218 infantry divisions, 17 army headquarters staff, 71 divisional headquarter staff, 7,200 heavy artillery pieces, and 9,000 field artillery pieces. The Treaty was successfully implemented for the reduction of the size of the Germany military, the number of officers and headquarters staff, and the number of heavy artillery pieces
[17]. Only 7 infantry divisions and 288 field artillery pieces remained by 1921. Reductions in Germany’s navy and air force were also overseen by the Treaty
[18].
Despite the reduction in the size of the German military, Germany had more manpower than France alone. This might work against France should the aforementioned limitations on Germany’s military cease to function. Over the course of the war, Germany lost 2,050,897 military men and 426,000 civilians
[19]. France lost 1,397,800 soldiers and 300,000 civilians. Moreover, 57% of France’s military casualties were under the age of 31
[20]. Both sides claimed approximately 4.2 million militarily wounded. In 1918, Germany’s population stood at 65.2 million at the end of the war, while France’s was at 38.5 million
[21].
Moreover, the French leaders had two outstanding caveats with the German military that they wanted to deal with: the issue of military education vis-à-vis training, and rotational army service. In the early Napoleonic wars against Prussia, Napoleon imposed upon Prussia in September, 1808, that she reduce her army to 42,000 men and not any higher. However, most likely due to lack of enforcement of the agreements at the time, Germany maintained an army of 150,000 men and passed much of its male population through service training in record times, and also mandated preliminary military instruction in its schools
[22]. The French realized that the abovementioned stipulations were therefore not adequate since Germany could functionally have a larger army should war break out again. It is not surprising that Article 176, Part V, of the Versailles Treaty called for the “suppression of [German] military schools”, thereby preventing Germany from recruiting a larger effective army than mandated. Compulsory military service was also abolished
[23]. The other issue is the region on Germany’s western border with France, the Rhineland, which France wanted demilitarized. Apart from its economic significance, the Rhineland also serves as a major military reinforcement point, with railroads geared towards resupply and relocation. Article 180 called for the disarmament of any outposts and fortifications within the Rhineland, thereby rendering it a demilitarized buffer zone between the two nations
[24].
Although the German military was substantially weakened by the Treaty, the German economy remained strong compared to that of France’s in the face of the cost of the war and the reparation clauses of the Treaty. National income and economic output was higher for Germany throughout much of the early 20th Century, and this is reflected in the country’s GDP per capita. In 1913, Germany’s GDP per capita was 237 billion Geary-Khamis dollars (GK$), while that of France was 145 billion GK$. By the end of the war, in 1918, Germany’s GDP per capita was at 145 billion GK$ while France’s was at 92 billion GK$
[25]. In spite of reparatory dues towards Britain, France, and other Allied powers, which – as articulated by Article 231 onwards of the Treaty – amounted to a total of 700 billion Francs of which 143 billion Francs would go to France
[26], Germany’s GDP still remained relatively high well into the mid- to late-1920’s, capping at 262 billion GK$ by 1929, when the Great Depression was on the horizon, with France’s at 194 billion GK$
[27]. This should not be surprising: Germany is basally an industrial nation compared to France, having thriving pharmaceutical, automotive, weapons, metallurgic, and electrical industries dating to the beginning of the 20th Century
[28].
Perhaps the biggest economic blow to Germany postwar was the annexation and demilitarization of the Rhineland. Apart from being a major military resupply point, the Rhineland houses much coal and iron resources as well as several factories of Krupp Industries, a major weapons manufacturer
[29]. The loss of the Rhineland would reduce Germany to 89% of its population, 92% of its territory, 85% of its railroad and river traffic, 88% of its coal mines, 67% of its prewar metallurgic production capability, and less than 20% of its prewar annual iron ore production output. Indeed, much of the Rhineland’s iron ore processing was reduced to around 20% of its prewar annual output when the area was demilitarized and jointly administered by the British and the French, but the other industries remained largely unaffected, most of them reduced to 90% of their prewar production output
[30]. One can assume, therefore, that fundamentally, Germany’s economy was stronger than that of France’s, and was better off even without the Rhineland and Saar Valley.
Despite Germany’s economic setbacks, France’s already worse-off economy was hard-hit from the War. Germany’s 1870 annexation of the French-controlled Saar Basin cost the French an annual coal output of nearly 17 million tons, and crippled the French economy during the later stages of the war
[31]. Moreover, much of France’s industrial infrastructure in the northeast, which produced about a quarter of the country’s productive capital and at least 50% of its industrially-manufactured goods (metals and textiles), was destroyed by the German army
[32]. Also, at least 2.7 million Frenchmen and Frenchwomen were driven out of their homes by the German military, and only half of those employed in the ravaged areas returned to work at the end of the war. The ensuing refugee and employment crisis would ensure a further crimp on France’s resources. Around 4,000 km of railroads and 53,000 km of roads were also destroyed by the German army, thereby hindering transportation of goods and personnel, and subsequently the French economy
[33]. French military losses also entailed a 15% labor loss in France’s private economic sector
[34].
The annexation of the Saar Valley and the Rhineland did little to increase postwar industrial output or give France room to recuperate from her losses
[35]. When the French did move in to claim the resources in the areas it annexed, however, they were not able to capitalize on them since the German factory workers there passively resisted their control
[36]. Since the Treaty did not burden Germany with the maintenance of the forces administering the annexed Saar Valley and the demilitarized Rhineland, France alone would be responsible for the costly maintenance of occupation forces in these areas, increasing the burden on its comparatively weaker economy
[37].
Politically, France’s actions compromised its position with respect to that of Germany. Postwar, France sought the help of its allies in guaranteeing its own security. However, this was done not out of “fear in the years to come… [of]… a German attack, but [rather of] systematic failure to execute the Treaty”
[38]. Georges Clemenceau sought to persuade British Prime Minister Lloyd George to augment France’s occupation forces in the Rhineland with British troops. Lloyd George deemed it a logistical impossibility, and that he was
"equally opposed both to a permanent Army, and to the use of British troops outside English territory. Furthermore, occupation tends to create a nationalist irritation not only on the left bank of the Rhine but throughout all of Germany... nor do we agree as to the creation of an independent state on the left bank of the Rhine."[39]
Britain’s position seemed very justifiable: a foreign military presence on German land would embolden rightwing or militaristic political groups within Germany, and would prove disastrous in the long run
[40]. However, the French remained adamant in maintaining occupation forces in the Rhineland. Andre Tardieu, Clemenceau’s lieutenant at the time, claimed that
"To ask us to give up occupation, is like asking England and the United States to sink their fleet of battleships. We refuse."[41]
To which Lloyd George replied that the occupation “amounts to making Germany pay for the cost and upkeep of the French army... [It is] ruinous because it will absorb to the detriment of the indemnity fund the best part of the German resources."
[42] As far as the Treaty would allow, the allies were interested in occupying only annexed territories, and were also strict on not inflicting any outright “punitive damages” on Germany
[43]. The French position was therefore one of control and political dismemberment of the German Republic, while the remaining allies mainly sought reparations from the defeated Central Power as well as its disarmament. France’s attitude toward this matter might have served to isolate its own position from the rest of the allies and weaken any commitment to the Treaty’s stipulations. The British, it seems, did not want to get themselves involved in any aggressive motion towards Germany.
Probably the most important programs that the French clashed with in this regard were Woodrow Wilson’s Fourteen Points and the League of Nations, of which the French were trying to delay until their interests in Germany were met. Among Wilson’s Fourteen Points included allocation of German-controlled territory to a number of nations, including France and the future state of Poland
[44]. The French were especially bold on the matter of Alsace-Lorraine, a chunk of land on the southern German-French border, to which they sought a dual purpose: first, as a sort of “buffer” in that its inhabitants would fight for France “should the Germans cross the Rhine”; and second, as a crucial fulfillment of vengeful French Foreign Policy since the 1870's
[45]. However, Alsace-Lorraine wasn’t the only piece of land on the French agenda. The French leadership, more notably Clemenceau and Field Marshal Foch, wanted to break up German territory and create “more separate and independent republics”. Foch asserted on the right of these populations to their own self-determination, a facet backed by Wilson’s Fourteen Points and one they used to their own advantage
[46]. However, the French plans were met with fierce resistance from the Allies for the same reasons aforementioned by Lloyd George. Consequently, the territories taken from Germany were mainly allotted to the new Polish state or to France in the case of Alsace-Lorraine. Therefore, France was left at a politically weaker position than what it was aiming for.
It should be no surprise that France’s hostility towards Germany following its submission to the Versailles Treaty only garnered Germany more sympathy from the Entente powers, mainly the U.S. and Britain
[47]. As such, France remained isolated in its efforts to weaken Germany through any means it thought necessary, whether it was through the usage of its own military resources, or through the resources of other nations such as the British navy and the American military. In light of France’s concerns, the American President Wilson offered his nation’s backing to France should it be attacked, though this backing was subject to approval by the Executive Council of the League of Nations
[48]. That backing did not materialize because the U.S. Senate voted not to ratify the Versailles Treaty nor join the League of Nations for that matter
[49].
Nevertheless, the Treaty of Versailles itself seemed practically unfeasible in light of the economic, human, and military resources required to fulfill its conditions. The total cost of the War on Germany was around 48% of its prewar (1913) GDP high while its reparations dues exceeded that amount by 161%. Altogether, Germany’s debt and reparations amounted to 309% of its 1913 GDP high. Britain and France, whose debts amounted to 144% and 133% their 1913 GDP per capita respectively, could not allocate resources for maintenance of their forces in the Rhineland and Saar Valley for over the 12 to 15 year period mandated in the Treaty let alone indefinitely and thus would not have the capability to sustain or enforce the agreements.
[50] Such faulty foresight would eventually lead to a loosening of the Treaty’s conditions and a reduction in Germany’s burden of debt and reparations on a per annum basis.
[51] This downtime in enforcing the Treaty is shown well in a remark by Lloyd George in early 1919: “[the] Germans are demobilizing slowly. They have still more than fifty divisions.”
[52] Furthermore, the lack of commitment to the League of Nations – a means to promote security of the Versailles conditions – underscored the inefficiency of the Treaty further still in the sense that it demoted commitment to obligations set by the Treaty and carried out by parties who have no staked interests in their assigned postings (such as the British in the Rhineland).
[53] In effect, the Treaty of Versailles comes across as being too idealistic, or even vindictive, and one that completely ignores economic, social, political, and militaristic consequences.
To sum up, the Versailles Treaty weakened Germany’s military, but not its economy. Furthermore, the political ramifications of the Versailles Treaty proved to be detrimental to France’s position, and Germany was not as burdened or weakened enough as has been shown. Though this concludes the topic for now, further research involving more explicit economic and military analysis is required to fully assess the political, social, and economic implications of the losses and gains by nations following the war and following the implementation of the Treaty, and how they play in the issue of their national strengths.
Endnotes
[1] Andre Tardieu, “The Truth about the Treaty”, p. 157
[2] Tardieu, p. 132
[3] Paul Birdsall, “Versailles: Twenty Years After”, p. 19
[4] Birdsall, p. 116
[5] Birdsall, p. 298
[6] Gary Schaub, Jr., “Deterrence, Compellence, and Prospect Theory”, p. 389
[7] Schaub Jr., p. 390
[8] Brian Lai, “Effect of Different Types of Military Mobilization and their Outcomes”, p. 217
[9] Schaub Jr., p. 391
[10] Gerry Hendershot, “Population Size, Military Power, and Antinatal Policy”, p. 519
[11] Nicholas Kristof, “The Rise of China”, p.59
[12] Hendershot, p. 519
[13] Hendershot, p. 521
[14] David French, “The Meaning of Attrition”, p. 391
[15] Torsten Persson, “Do Political Institutions Shape Economic Policy?”, p. 883
[16] Tardieu, p. 132
[17] Tardieu, p. 142
[18] Tardieu, p. 133
[19] Heeres-Sanitaetsinspektion im Reichskriegsministeriums, “Sanitaetsbericht über das deutsche Heer, (deutsches Feld- und Besatzungsheer), im Weltkriege, 1914-1918”, p.10
[20] Tardieu, p.157
[21] Angus Maddison, “The World Economy: Historical Statistics”, p.36
[22] Tardieu, p.155
[23] Tardieu, p.133
[24] Birdsall, p.295
[25] Maddison, p.48
[26] Tardieu, p.290
[27] Maddison, p.50
[28] William Moul, “Power Parity and War between Powers”, p.475
[29] Amos Yoder, “The Ruhr Authority and the German Problem”, p.346
[30] Tardieu, p.165
[31] Birdsall, p.224
[32] Tardieu, p.157, 377
[33] Tardieu, p. 379
[34] Stephen Broadberry and Mark Harrison, “The Economics of World War One”, p. 176
[35] Broadberry and Harrison, p.171
[36] Birdsall, p.300
[37] Birdsall, p.295
[38] Tardieu, p.197
[39] Tardieu, p.173
[40] Birdsall, p.302
[41] Tardieu, p.175
[42] Tardieu, p.197
[43] Birdsall, p.251
[44] Birdsall, p.28
[45] Tardieu, p.233
[46] Birdsall, p.32
[47] Birdsall, p.298
[48] Tardieu, p.205
[49] Birdsall, p.297
[50] Broadberry and Harrison, p.69
[51] Birdsall, p.301
[52] Tardieu, p.127
[53] Birdsall, p.24
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Salaam, from Saracen
